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ABSTRACT
In President Reagan's New Federalism, the federal government had a decreased
role in the domestic sector and the state and local governments had increased roles with
more of the responsibilities. His grants-in-aid policy made the states play a larger
leadership role. Reagan was critical of welfare and redistributive services programs.
Under Reagan, was the federal government more apt to cut programs that targeted the
poor and were the state and local governments less apt to replace the cuts? The point of
the research was to determine the impact of the 1981 Reagan budget cuts on city spending
for welfare and spending for housing and community development. The hypothesis is
that Reagan's budget cuts will impact city spending for welfare more than spending for
housing and community development. If political theorists, like Daniel Elazar, were
correct, region and political culture would be the most important predictors of city
spending on welfare and spending on housing and community development. If political
theorists, like Paul Peterson, were correct, the most important predictors of city spending
on welfare would be fiscal pressure and dependency on federal revenue. If political
scholars, like David Morgan and Robert England, were correct, city population would be
an important predictor of city spending for welfare and spending for housing and
community development.

Vll

Multiple regression analyses were done on a listing of 118 cities, over 10,000 and
less than 1,000,000, which spent for both welfare and housing and community
development from 1976-87. A comparison of the spending means for 1976-77, 1981-82
and 1986-87 showed that the 1981 Reagan budget cuts impacted welfare more than
housing and community development. Only the moralistic and individualistic political
cultures were consistently statistically significant at the .05 level with a positive
relationship to welfare spending (other variables in the equation controlled) but they
explained little of the variation in spending on welfare for 1976-87. Only city
dependency on federal revenue was consistently statistically significant at the .05 level
with a positive relationship to housing and community development spending (other
variables in the equation controlled) but explained little of the variation in spending on
housing and community development for 1976-87. Removing the dummy variables for
region and political culture had more of an impact on the prediction of spending for
welfare than on spending for housing and community development.

vm

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The Problem
President Ronald Reagan made cuts and basic changes in the domestic programs
of the federal government. His main goals were to decrease the role of the federal
government in the domestic sector and to increase the responsibilities of the state and
local governments. His activism on the grant-in-aid policy issues made the states play a
larger and more important leadership role in American federalism. Reagan was very
critical of welfare programs.1 Was the federal government, then, more likely to cut
programs that targeted the poor and was it more likely that these cuts would not be
replaced by state and local governments? The point of the research is to determine the
impact of the Reagan administration budget cuts on city spending for welfare and
economic development. The hypothesis is that the Reagan administration budget cuts
will have more impact on city spending for welfare than city spending for economic
development.

'"President Reagan's Economic Proposals Text," Congressional Quarterly. 1981,
XXXVII, p. 15-E.
1

2

A list of 118 cities in the United States with over 10,000 and less than one million
residents, which spent funds for welfare and for housing and urban renewal or community
development, was drawn for 1976-772, 1981-823, and 1986-874 from census data. The
census data listed only cities over 10,000 or more. Population was given as a percentage
of one million people to simplify data presentation. Two multiple regression analyses
were done to predict spending on welfare and city spending on housing and urban
renewal or community development for 1976-77, 1981-82 and 1986-87 with the
following independent variables: region, political culture, population, fiscal pressure and
federal revenue dependency. If political theorists, like Daniel Elazar, were correct, region
and political culture would be the most important predictors of city spending on welfare
and city spending on housing and urban renewal or community development.5 If
theorists, like Paul Peterson, were correct, the most important predictors of city spending
on welfare would be fiscal pressure and dependency on federal revenue.6*If researchers,
like David Morgan and Robert England were correct, city population would be an

2U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Census of Governments.
1977: Government Finances. Vol. 4, No. 4, Table 22.
3U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Census of Governments.
1981: Government Finances. Vol. 4, No. 4, Table 18.
4U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Census of Governments.
1987: Government Finances. Vol. 4, No. 4, Table 18.
5Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States (New York:
Crowell, 1966), p. 97 and 129.
6Paul E. Peterson, City Limits (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981),
p. 16, 55 and 58.
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important predictor of city spending for welfare and spending for housing and urban
renewal or community development.7
In order to study the impact of President Reagan's budget cuts on city spending for
welfare and city spending for housing and urban renewal or community development,
background is provided on the various interpretations of American federalism, the history
of federal aid to cities, and the research done on the impact of the Reagan cuts.

Background
Federalism
E. E. Schattschneider, a political philosopher, looked at politics as a way of
clearing public conflict, which usually started in the private arena, mainly through
persuasion and, thereby, keeping the freedom and order. He believed that notions of
equity added to conflict by allowing outside interference and by encouraging people to
seek legal remedies for their grievances.8 Peterson felt that federal government goals of
equity in redistributive policy conflicted with local government goals of efficiently
developing the local economy. He agreed with Schattschneider that the way to restrict
conflict was to localize it and the way to expand conflict was to nationalize it. Peterson
said that since redistributive policies are at odds with city economic interests, they are

7David R. Morgan and Robert E. England, "The Small Cities Block Grant
Program: An Assessment of Programmatic Change Under State Control," Public
Administration Review. November/December, 1984, p. 481.
8Jerome M. Mileur, "The Politics of E. E. Schattschneider," PS: Political Science
& Politics. Vol. XXV (June, 1992), p. 176 and 177.
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often excluded from the local political agenda.9 Schattschneider said that control of
conflict by the decision making level was the main tool of political strategy which was set
by the visibility, intensity, scope and direction of the conflict. He noted that an important
part of that political strategy was the substitution of conflict. He stated that the
Republicans exploited such issues as welfare in order to play down economic issues as
the recession which the Democrats organized around. Reagan, in his report on the state
of the Nation's economy in 1981, raised the issue of welfare only for the truly needy and
set the direction of conflict. He substituted one conflict, welfare, for another, the
recession, while fashioning his "New Federalism". Schattschneider claimed that
arguments about federalism, local self-government, centralization and decentralization
were arguments about the degree of conflict which was evident in Reagan's turning over
the administration of the Small Cities portion of the CDBG program to states where
original purposes of the program, benefits to low and moderate income people and
elimination of slums and blight, conflicted with the priorities of state and local
government officials.10
To political scientist Daniel Elazar, American federalism meant a partnership
where the federal system and the states shared power with negotiation to achieve common
goals. He said that the states responded to this cooperative arrangement in different ways.

9Peterson, City Limits, p. 167.
10E.E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People (New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich College Publishers, 1975), P. 2, 7, 11, 20 and 25.
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He noted that political culture, sectionalism, and the continuing frontier were the sources
of the variation in state responses to this partnership.11
Elazar said that political culture was a pattern of beliefs and attitudes toward the
government and the political process. He designated political culture as moralistic,
individualistic, and traditionalistic.
In the moralistic political culture, the public and politician think of politics as
public activity for the advancement of the common good. Those who govern are honest,
selfless and committed to the public welfare with power to intervene in the economic and
social life of the state or community for the common good. It is the duty of every person
to participate and government service is considered public service. Politics is not used
for private economic gain. Party loyalty is not important.12
In the individualistic political culture, the government exist to handle the demands
of the people it was created to serve. Government action is restricted to areas, especially
economic, which encourage private initiative and access to the marketplace. Political
party is important since politics is a way for people to improve themselves socially and
economically. Individualistic political culture is based on a system of mutual obligations
which were founded in personal relationships. Politicians and the public look at political
activity as only for the professional and there is no place for amateurs. Public officials

1’Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States, p. 79.
12Ibid- n.91.
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are supposed to get the public what it wants and they are not willing to begin new
programs on their own.13
The traditionalistic political culture confines the real political power to those who
inherited their position through family ties, social position or wealth. Political parties are
not very important. Good government is the maintenance and encouragement of
traditional values.14
Elazar thought that the geography of political culture (as modified by local
conditions) laid the foundations of sectionalism. He said the sectionalism meant that the
country was divided historically, culturally and economically into the greater Northeast,
the greater South and the greater West. He noted that the greater Northeast included all
states north of the Ohio and Potomac Rivers and east of Lake Michigan; the greater South
included states below the greater Northeast but east of the Mississippi River plus
Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas; and the rest of the states make up
the greater West. This is the justification for including region and political culture in the
study.15
Since Elazar observed that the geography of political culture was directly related
to the continuing frontier, the American frontier will be included in the discussion on
federalism. He said that the conquest of one frontier led to the opening of another which

l3Ibid.. p. 87.
l4Ibid.. p. 93.
15Ibid„ p. 114.
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created major social and economic changes in the nation's political institutions, especially
in the roles and functions of federalism and intergovernmental relations.16
Elazar explained that the American frontier passed through three stages and was
now in the fourth stage. He said that the first three consecutive stages of the American
frontier were the rural-land frontier, the urban-industrial frontier, and the metropolitantechnological frontier. He defined the rural-land frontier as the classic American frontier
which lasted from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth century. He stated that,
during the urban-industrial frontier, the cities were transformed from service centers for
the rural area into independent centers of opportunity and producers of wealth. He noted
that, in the metropolitan-technological frontier, rapidly changing technologies and
settlement patterns spread the urbanized population within the large metropolitan
regions.17
Elazar observed that the fourth stage, the citybelt-cybemetic frontier, was
generated by the metropolitan-technological frontier. He noted that the citybeltcybemetic frontier first appeared in the Northeast when the Atlantic coast metropolitan
regions united with each other in a 600-mile long "large city" made up of urban and
suburban settlements with older cities and smaller ones sharing importance. He said that
the increasing use of computer technology (cybernetic tools) made such citybelts possible.
He stated that the citybelt-cybemetic frontier developed as an original form in the South
and the West. Elazar concluded that each new frontier brought changes in economic

l6Ibid„ p. 96.
17Ibid.. p. 98.
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activities, new settlement patterns, political changes, and social problems. He added that
the variations in state responses to this partnership between the federal system and the
states, American federalism, were explained by sectional and cultural differences in the
impact of each frontier.18
Political science scholar Paul Peterson thought that a theory of American
federalism was possible if cities, states, and the national government were considered
different from each other. He concentrated his work on cities and described them as
small political systems with politics that are limited unlike national politics that are not.
He said that the political system of the nation influences city choices but that the city
interests decide policy choices.19
Peterson held that the main interest of cities in urban public policy is the keeping
up and the improvement of their economies by attracting productive labor and capital. He
listed three types of public policies: developmental, allocational and redistributive that
are affected by fiscal capacity, demand, and supply factors. He stated that fiscal capacity
of a city affects its spending.20 He said that developmental policies contribute to city
productivity by increasing the local economy, local tax base and resources.21 He
described allocational policies as neither developmental nor redistributive but those

18Daniel Elazar, "The 1980s: Enter in the Citybelt-Cybemetic Frontier," Publius.
X (Winter, 1980), p. 23.
19Peterson, City Limits, p. 4.
20Ibid„ p. 46.
2'Ibid., p. 42.
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which have neutral economic effects. He depicted redistributive policies as those policies
that have negative economic effects even though the needy benefit.22 He remarked that
local governments usually shy away from redistributive policies. He noted that the
national government has the greatest responsibility for them.23 The author of the present
study will be testing whether this is true.
Peterson stated that developmental, allocational and redistributive policies differ
depending on the structure of local governmental systems. He said that some amount of
redistribution happens even at the lower level in big cities. He noted that the many, small
and competitive local governments keep redistribution to a minimum and do not include
it in political agendas.24
Peterson said that each of these policies affects the interests of cities differently
which he demonstrated through regression analysis. He found that redistributive policies
were a function of a city's fiscal capacity. He reported that developmental expenditures
were affected by supply and demand and that allocative policies were affected by both
fiscal capacity and supply and demand.25 He also found that the results changed very
slightly when southern states were dropped from the analysis.26 He added that the
decisions made by local governments regarding developmental, allocative and

22Ibid.. p. 44.
23Ibid., p. 78.
24Ibid„ p. 16.
25Ibid.. p. 59.
26Ibid„ p. 58.
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redistributive policies are political decisions made by local government officials with
concerns over long-term economic welfare and limits of what is possible.27
Peterson defined federalism as a system of higher and lower levels of government,
each having separate and autonomous responsibility for the social and economic welfare
of those in their jurisdictions.28 Peterson compared the goals of central and lower
governments in a federal system. He found that local governments focus on operating
efficiency to keep an economic base. He said that the federal government's domestic
policy focuses on keeping a balance between developmental and redistributive goals.29
Peterson also compared the different functional responsibilities between central
and local governments. He said that the local governments provide services according to
need and use developmental activity to further the local economy. He noted that the
national government is responsible for overall economic growth (which is developmental
policy with widespread effects) and is mainly responsible for redistributive policies.30 He
commented that when national policy is developmental, local and national goals overlap
and policy is usually carried out with intergovernmental cooperation.31 He added that
when national policy is redistributive, federal government goals (which include equity)
conflict with local government goals (which include the efficient development of the

27Ibid.. p. 26.
28Ibid.. p. 67.
29Ibid„ p. 58.
30Ibid„ p. 81.
31Ibid., p. 82.
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local economy) which makes implementation of federal programs more difficult.32
Peterson concluded that economic limits mold local government policy and politics and
that local governments differ from each other. He emphasized the fact that some local
governments are able to carry on their economic interests while others work under
constraints that limit how much they can increase their economic base.33 He mentioned
that redistributive policies are more likely to occur in wealthier cities.34
If Peterson is correct, the most important predictors of city spending on welfare
are fiscal pressure and dependency on federal revenue and the most important predictors
of city spending on developmental policies are demand-supply factors. Fiscal pressure
and dependency on federal revenue were selected as independent variables to be used
with others in multiple regression analyses on city spending for welfare and city spending
for housing and urban renewal or community development for 1976-77, 1981-82 and
1986-87 to determine the important predictors of such spending.

History of Federal Aid
Grants-in-aid, from higher to lower levels of government, were firmly established
in the United State by the 1950s since the federal government was better able to raise
revenues from tax sources than state and local governments (which met citizen resistance
to tax increases). Grants-in-aid consisted of federal money given to the states and federal

32Ibid.. p. 83.
33Ibid„ p. 210.
34Ibid„ p.214.
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or state money given to the local governments for special purposes under the grantor's
supervision and review. It was up to the states or local governments to accept or reject
the grants-in-aid. There are general three kinds of grants-in-aid (although definitions may
differ): flat grants, in which recipient governments get equal amounts of money for a
program without the matching of funds but may pay administrative costs; proportional
grants, in which each recipient government gets a grant in proportion to its contribution
based on set formulas; and percentage grants, in which recipient government is paid a set
percentage of the cost to maintain a certain program.35*
In the United States, there is a variety of social welfare programs which function
differently from each other. These are Unemployment Compensation, Food Stamps,
Medicare, Medicaid, Veterans Programs, and Aid to Families with Dependent
Children(AFDC).
The federal government established the basic structure for welfare policies in the
Social Security Act of 1935. The Act contained three provisions (which have been
amended): Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI) which provides
pensions to retired or disabled workers out of a trust fund formed from a payroll tax
placed on workers and employers; Unemployment Compensation which consists of cash
payments to those temporarily but involuntarily out of work (funded by a state tax on
employers with extended benefits funded by state and federal taxes); and AFDC which

35Daniel J. Elazar, "The Shaping of Intergovernmental Relations in the Twentieth
Century," in The Politics of American Federalism, ed. by Daniel Elazar (Lexington:
Heath, 1969), p. 20-30.
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provides cash grants (funded by the state with federal reimbursements) mainly to female
headed poor families.36
Hence, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 was seen as a major antipoverty
effort by President Johnson. It centered on training and services for the poor. The Food
Stamp program began in 1964 during the Johnson administration and is federally funded
with the states bearing administrative costs. Under the program, the needy can exchange
coupons for food at the stores. At first, the program was limited in scope with only the
poorest eligible to buy the stamps. In 1977, Congress dropped the requirement that the
stamps be bought and expanded the program eligibility.37
The Medicare Act of 1965 established Medicare and Medicaid. Medicare is a
health care program for the elderly and is not means tested. It is funded by payroll tax
and member contributions. Medicaid provides health care to the needy through payments
to health care providers. It is means tested and funded through federal matching grants to
the states. In 1972, Congress amended the Social Security Act with Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) which provides assistance to the aged and poor. It is funded by the
federal government. Most states will supplement it.38
In 1981, President Ronald Reagan came into office with a goal to cut welfare
spending. He persuaded Congress to make big changes in some major welfare programs

36George McKenna, The Drama of Democracy: American Government and
Politics (Guilford: Duskin, 1990), p. 500.
37Ibid.. p. 505-506.
38Ibid.. p. 507.
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the same year. Household income had to be less than 130 percent of the federal poverty
line to be eligible for the Food Stamp program. Striking workers were excluded from this
program. States were no longer required to provide 13 weeks of unemployment
compensation beyond the 26 weeks standard. The amount of the deductible for hospital
bills in Medicare was raised. The federal contribution to state Medicaid programs was
reduced. Only households less than 150 percent of the state-determined standard of need
could get AFDC benefits. Striking workers were also excluded from this program.
Working mothers took a cut in AFDC benefits. A family on AFDC could only own a
house, car, and less than $1,000 in other assets. States could consider food stamps and
housing assistance as income when deciding eligibility. These were some of the changes
made in social welfare programs but not all the ones that Reagan wanted.39
However, there was a shift in federal aid to cities from federal public housing
programs which provided low-rent public housing for the poor (who could not afford
decent housing otherwise) under the Housing Act of 1937 to urban renewal with the
Housing Act of 1949. The Act created housing for the low-moderate income and the
removal of slums and blight with the aid of the private sector and government subsidies.40
The Housing Act of 1954 represented a broader concept of urban renewal. More
government funds were addressed to rehabilitation and conservation of urban areas. It
provided for slum clearance, new housing and downtown area renovation in the central

39James G. Wilson, American Government: Institutions and Policies (Lexington:
Heath, 1983), p. 484.
‘“ John Engen, Andrew Mott and John Roos, Housing and Public Policy
(Cambridge: Ballinger, 1981), p. 14.
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cities.41 Local governments could now use ten percent of the federal grant for
nonresidential construction to increase their tax base and economic viability.42 The
Housing Act of 1961 and the 1965 amendments provided cities with open space funds to
acquire land for recreational, historical and conservational purposes.43 The Model cities
program was enacted in 1966 and administered by Housing and Urban Development
(HUD). Federal funds were used for experimental programs in a small number of large
cities having severe problems. Federal aid evolved into block grants with Nixon's "New
Federalism".44
In 1971, President Richard Nixon established federal grant programs that
transferred power from Washington to state and local governments with more money and
less interference. In the future, the states would have the responsibility for planning and
administering the programs. Nixon proposed Revenue Sharing (which distributed federal
funds to state and local governments to do with as they wanted), the Comprehensive

41Daniel Grant and Lloyd Omdahl. State and Local Government in Urban America
(Dubuque: Brown, 1989), p. 37.
42Robert Kweit and Mary Grisez Kweit. People and Politics in Urban America
(Pacific Grove: Brooks/Cole, 1990), p. 328.
43Mark Francis, Lisa Cashden and Lynn Paxton, Community Open Spaces:
Greening Neighborhoods Through Community Action and Land Conservation
(Washington, D.C.: Island, 1984), p. 17.
“^Donald Kettl, The Regulation of America Federalism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1983), p. 15.
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Employment and Training Act (CETA), and the Community Development Block Grant
(CDBG) program.45
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 established the CDBG
program. The CDBG program was passed by Congress to streamline federal aid and was
signed by President Gerald Ford.46 Initially, the CDBG program required communities to
design projects for the low and moderate income people. The CDBG program
consolidated seven categorical grant programs: rehabilitation loans, urban renewal,
Model Cities, Neighborhood Facilities programs, open space programs, and water and
sewer grants.47 The CDBG had a formula that automatically entitled cities with 50,000
people or more and counties with more than 200,000 people an annual grant with HUD
approval. Cities with less than 50,000 people competed for the discretionary funding.
The CDBG program provided funds for the elimination of slums and blight, for solving
problems of low and moderate income families, and for projects to solve urgent
community development.48* Local governments could use the funds for projects like
housing rehabilitation, downtown improvements, parks, and clearance of substandard

45Ibid.. p. 16.
“^Richard Nathan and Fred Doolittle, Reagan and the States (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 40.
47Kweit and Kweit, People and Politics in Urban America, p. 264.
48U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Community Planning and
Development, Office of Evaluation, Community Development Block Grant Entitlement
Cities: The First Year Planning and Application Process. Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1976, p. 1.
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buildings.49 Many communities responded by identifying projects citywide which
enabled them to put projects where they wanted while complying with the rules.50 The
large amount of discretionary funding gave neighborhoods the motive to get involved and
had few guidelines for fund use except the requirements of a public hearing for citizen
input on the proposals.51 In 1977, congress enacted a second formula based on city decay,
poverty and population growth because of problems with the distribution formula.
Congress allowed the communities to pick the formula which gave them the greatest
amount of funding.52 The CDBG program was good for local governments because of the
predictable funds and program flexibility.53
There was a shift in federal policy which started with President Jimmy Carter and
was accentuated under President Ronald Reagan. Carter cut back on urban aid because
inflation caused a problem with the nation's economy. Under the Reagan administration,
Congress revised the CDBG programs by going to minimal requirements. The 1981
revisions were similar to the programs Nixon had proposed ten years earlier. The
justification for the 1981 revisions were also similar: federal programs were bogged

49Paul Dommel, "Social Targeting in Community Development," Political Science
Quarterly. Vol. 95 (Fall, 1980), p. 465.
50Howard Hall, Neighborhoods: Their Place in Urban Life (Beverly Hills: Sage,
1984), p. 247.
5lKweit and Kweit, People and Politics in Urban America, p. 207.
52Kettl, The Regulation of American Federalism, p. 18.
53Paul Famham, "The Targeting of Federal Aid: Continued Ambivalence," Public
Policy. Vol. 24, No. 1 (winter, 1981), p. 88.
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down with regulations and shifted intergovernmental balance toward the federal
government.54
President Reagan's proposals for economic recovery and state-oriented federalism
affected the size and structure of federal grants-in-aid to state and local governments and
the roles of federal, state, and local governments.55 In a February 1981 speech to
Congress, President Reagan called for massive tax cuts and reductions in domestic
spending to decrease the size of the federal government in the domestic area.56 On
August 13, 1981, Congress responded by passing the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act. Instead of consolidating ninety categorical grants into four block grants, as Reagan
wanted, Congress consolidated fifty categorical programs into nine block grants: four in
health services, three in social services, one in education, and one in community
development.57
The 1981 Budget Act gave the states more authority under the Small Cities
portion of the CDBG program. Cities with less than 50,000 residents, that once competed
for discretionary funding, automatically received funds under a formula.58 State
governors were the main people shaping the Small Cities Grant programs. The states

54Kettl, The Regulation of American Federalism, p. 21.
55Nathan and Doolittle, Reagan and the States, p. 44.
56James Alexander, "Policy Design and the Impact of Federal Aid to Declining
Communities," Growth and Change. January, 1981, p. 40.
57Morgan and England, "The Small Cities Grant Program," p. 40.
58Nathan and Doolittle, Reagan and the States, p. 81.
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decided which communities got money, the amount they got, the use of the grant, and the
standards they were accountable for. This change in grant-in-aid made it possible for the
preferences and priorities of state and local officials to be reflected in the Small Cities
Grant Program and increased the role of the states.59
The assumption of responsibility for the Small Cities portion of the CDBG
program by the states offered an opportunity to study the consequences of Reagan's "New
Federalism". President Reagan, in his first State of the Union Address in 1982, said that
it was his intention to return to a clearer distinction between the powers granted to the
federal government and those reserved to the states. He said that he wanted to give the
states a chance to spend government revenues.60
The Small Cities portion of the CDBG program illustrated the conflict between
the original federal government intention and local government goals. The Small Cities
portion of the CDBG program, as administered by HUD, was initially intended to be
redistributive with the primary benefits going to low and moderate income people. States
had only to give "maximum feasible priority" to benefiting low and moderate income
families and preventing slums and blight while administering the Small Cities portion of
the CDBG program. The Small Cities portion of the CDBG program was designed to
give the local governments an ample amount of discretion in selecting projects and

59Neal R. Peirce and Robert Guskind, "Reagan Budget Cutters Eye Community
Development Block Grant Program On Its 10th. Birthday," National Journal. Vol. 17,
No, 1 (January 5, 1985), p. 13 and 14.
^"Reagan's State of the Union Address," Congressional Quarterly. 1982,
XXXVIII, p. 5-E.
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activities to meet the needs of low and moderate income groups. The states, in
administering the Small Cities portion of the CDBG program, allowed local governments
considerable leeway in accomplishing these ends while abiding by the rules. With
decentralization, the Small Cities grant program conflicted with initial federal
government purposes by reflecting the preferences and priorities of state and local
officials.61

Impact of the Reagan Cuts
Researchers Nathan and Doolittle said that the theories of American federalism
can be grouped as the two-level view of government (federal-state) and the three-level
view of government (federal-state-local). President Reagan supported the two-level view
which stressed the importance of the Tenth Amendment which said that powers not
explicitly assigned to the national government resided with the state and the people.
Nathan and Doolittle said that Reagan's "New Federalism" would have given the state
governments responsibility for policy making, financing and administration of some
programs with the federal government taking the responsibility for policy making,
financing, and administration of some programs at the national level. They commented
that what actually occurred during Reagan's first term was that the federal government
was still included in policy making and financing of the Reagan new block grants

6IMorgan and England, "The Small Cities Grant Program," p. 477.
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(although at a smaller degree) while the states assumed more administrative responsibility
for them.62
Nathan and Doolittle analyzed the observations of field researchers in fourteen
states on the effects of Reagan's changes in grants for these state governments and forty
local governments within the sample states. The states were picked in terms of size,
location, and economic and social characteristics. The states were: Arizona, California,
Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas and Washington.63
Nathan and Doolittle, in their initial analysis of the cuts and changes in grants
made by the Reagan administration in the first year, revealed the following things. The
cuts were appreciable and were aimed at those on welfare and the working poor rather
than on state and local governments. Reagan pushed hard for the idea of "workfare"
which required one to work off the amount received for welfare. Reagan's new block
grants and provisions allowed the states to reorganize Medicaid which shifted more
responsibilities from the federal government to the states. State and local governments
first reacted to federal cuts in some programs by coping. They used carryover funds,
shifted funds among the accounts or just procrastinated. State and local governments did
not, however, cope with cuts made in welfare programs (AFDC and food stamps) and the
public service programs but transferred them directly to the recipients.64

62Nathan and Doolittle, Reagan and the States, p. 361.
63Ibid.. p. 4.
“ Ibid., p. 13.
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The 1981 change in the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program
gave the states more authority under the Small Cities portion of the CDBG program. The
states, through their governors, administered the Small Cities portion of the CDBG.
States, selecting projects and setting up distribution procedures, favored economic
development and public works over housing and neighborhood rehabilitation. In 1981,
funds to small cities increased from 25 percent to 30 percent while funds to large cities
decreased from 75 percent to 70 percent. Cities with populations over 50,000 increased
in the 1980 census. Funds for Community Development were cut by six percent ($220
million) in 1982 but received $1 billion by the Emergency Jobs Act of 1983 (funding for
large formula-funded cities increased $775.2 million and the Small Cities portion of the
CDBG program increased by $222.8 million) and federal appropriations of $3,468 billion
in 1984 and $3,372 billion in 1985.65
Nathan and Doolittle looked at the differences in the responses of all fourteen
states in the study sample to Reagan's cuts and changes in federal grants-in-aid. They
classified these states according to the state's response to replacing federal aid funding
cuts out of new revenues as: most pronounced response, intermediate response, and
minimal response. Florida, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Oklahoma made
the most pronounced responses to Reagan cuts and changes in federal grants-in-aid.
Eight states made intermediate responses: Mississippi, Ohio and Texas allocated some
new or additional state aid to replace federal aid cuts; Washington replaced federal aid
cuts at first but later rescinded; Arizona, Illinois, Missouri and South Dakota did not

65Ibid.. p. 81.
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replace federal aid cuts out of their own funds but concentrated on policy making and
administration of areas affected by the cuts. California made a minimal response to these
cuts in federal grants-in-aid.66
Nathan and Doolittle found two reasons that explained the variations in state
responses to the Reagan federal aid changes. The reasons were political and economic.
The political reasons related to the political culture of the state and the role of the political
leaders. The economic reasons were related to the state economic condition and to the
state government fiscal condition. The authors found that states with the strongest
economies and finances, along with key government officials favoring aid replacement,
produced the strongest response to Reagan’s cuts and changes in federal grants-in-aid.
This is the justification for using the work of the authors in this paper.67
Nathan and Doolittle obtained the political data on case-study states by classifying
each of the fourteen states according to: response of states to replacing federal aid
funding cuts out of new revenues (most pronounced, moderate or low); political ideology
(conservative, moderate or liberal according to per capita state and local government
spending for welfare); governor and party affiliation, 1984; and party split in the state
legislature. State welfare spending per capita was used as a proxy for political ideology.
States with the most pronounced response to cuts in 1984 had the following political
views in an earlier report on this study: New York and Massachusetts were liberal. New
Jersey and Oklahoma were moderate, and Florida was conservative. States with a

“ Ibid., p. 100.
67Ibid.. p. 107.
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moderate response to cuts had the following political views: Ohio, Washington, and
Illinois were moderate; and Mississippi, Texas, Arizona, Missouri and South Dakota
were conservative. California had a liberal political view and low response to cuts.68
They found political ideology influenced the response of state and local
governments to cuts in federal grants-in-aid especially where a state's political disposition
was changing. Florida's shift from conservative to moderate political balance of power
was behind the fiscal replacement of cuts. California went from a liberal to more
conservative political mood (with Republican governors since 1962 and tax and spending
limits passed by voters) and had a low response to replacing federal cuts. Mississippi and
Texas with conservative political ideology were shifting toward a moderate one with
small replacements of federal cuts.69
Nathan and Doolittle reported that the case studies showed political leaders
affected state responses to Reagan's cuts in grants-in-aid. They used the governors of
Arizona, Florida, Massachusetts, Ohio and South Dakota as examples of political leaders
being very influential in shaping their state's response to the Reagan cuts and changes in
grants-in-aid.70
Nathan and Doolitle classified the fourteen states in the sample according to
response to cuts in federal grants-in-aid and fiscal pressure from 1980-83. The response
of the state was listed as most pronounced, moderate or low. The degree of fiscal

68Ibid.. d. 109.
69Ibid.. p. 107-108.
70Ibid.. p. 108.
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pressure of the state was rated as extreme, moderate or little. States under extreme fiscal
pressure had insufficient revenue to meet the demands for essential services (no other
revenue available to increase own-raised revenue). States under moderate fiscal pressure
had insufficient funds to support current level of services (could use a new tax source,
increase existing taxes or cut service levels). States under little fiscal pressure had
sufficient revenue to cover any increase in expenditures. The degree of fiscal stress for
states with the most pronounced response (fiscal replacement of cuts) was moderate for
Florida, Massachusetts, and New York and little for New Jersey and Oklahoma. The
degree of fiscal stress for states with moderate response to cuts was extreme for Ohio,
Washington and Missouri; moderate for Mississippi, Arizona and Illinois; but little for
Texas and South Dakota. California had a low response to cuts and an extreme degree of
fiscal strain. The authors found that the states with the strongest economies and finances
had the strongest response to Reagan's cuts and changes in grants-in-aid.71
Nathan and Doolitle concluded their study by noting that the amount of benefits or
services provided by grants-in-aid, the strength of the grant's constituency and the
labeling of a grant as federal or state and local by state and local officials affected the way
state and local governments reacted to Reagan's cuts in federal aid even though Congress
later replaced some of the cuts and the economy recovered in 1983 and 1984. The greater
the amount of benefits or services, the more likely it was that the grant would be cut. The
greater the grant constituency, the less likely it was that the grant would be cut. State and
local officials were more likely to view a federal grant as having less flexibility in its use

71Ibid.. p. 111.
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and outside traditional state and local responsibility. Nathan and Doolittle found that the
more redistributive a grant was, the more probable it was that state and local governments
would not protect the grant from Reagan budget cuts.72 Nathan and Doolittle contended
that Reagan furthered his federalism reform notions significantly in his first term of office
which reflected his "New Federalism" that was a state-centered theory of American
federalism.73
Authors of papers commissioned by the Robert M. LaFollette Institute of Public
Affairs of the University of Wisconsin-Madison studied the Midwest response to
Reagan's "New Federalism". The states involved in the study were Indiana, Illinois,
Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin. The authors disagreed on the effects of the
Reagan cuts in grants-in-aid and policy changes on state and local governments in the
Midwest. Some of the authors thought that Reagan's "New Federalism" had a negative
effect on redistributive efforts by state and local governments while others thought that it
had little, if any, effect. The authors agreed that "the Midwest response to the New
Federalism was timid and anemic."74
Felton and Elazar held the view that there were two Midwests: the upper Midwest
(Minnesota, Michigan and Wisconsin) and the lower Midwest (Ohio, Illinois and
Indiana). They said that the upper Midwest had a moralistic political culture where the

^Ibid.. p. 96.
73Ibid.. p. 13.
74William Gormley and Peter K. Eisinger, ed., The Midwest Response to the New
Federalism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), p. 297.
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common good necessitated high taxes, more services, greater efforts to aid the most
disadvantaged, and issue-oriented party politics. They noted that the lower Midwest had
an individualistic political culture where economic motivation and private initiative were
important, party politics were job-oriented, and those with power got the benefits they
demanded. The authors found that the Midwest governors and legislators just accepted
the changes made by the Reagan administration without protest. The authors had
predicted a large variety of responses from acceptance to resistance by the politicians
because of the differences in political cultures of the two Midwests.75
Since Reagan was hostile to redistributive programs and overregulation of
business, the authors also expected a different response from the Midwest to Reagan's
New Federalism. The authors used their empirical studies to explain the Midwest
timidity to Reagan's provisions for the reform of American federalism and to assess the
importance of economics, dependency, political culture, partisanship, institutional
capacity (fiscal strain), city population and public policy. This is the justification for
including the work of the authors in this paper.76
The authors found that the recession of 1980-82 made these states less able to
make up for the cuts in federal grants-in-aid. The Midwest was hit hard by the recession
since it depended on durable goods production which fluctuates more than other kinds of
production. America had turned from a producer of goods to a producer of services.
High unemployment in the Midwest constrained politicians, especially, in redistributive

75Ibid.. p. 296.
76Ibid.. p. 297.
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policies. Consequently, there was a shift from redistributive uses to economic
development in the CDBG program in order to increase employment.77
The authors established that these Midwestern states got less in federal grants-inaid than they supplied in revenues and were less dependent than other states in certain
policy areas. The authors predicted that financial independence allows policy
independence but found this was false. Schram found that Midwestern states had a
greater amount of financial independence in welfare policy than other states but that they
accepted federal restrictions on welfare eligibility and benefits rather than lose federal
funds.78
The authors found little evidence to prove that moralistic states acted differently
from individualistic states. Schram noted that both Minnesota and Wisconsin put off
implementation of stipulations limiting welfare eligibility. Rimmerman reported that the
CDBG program in Columbus was not as redistributive as that in Milwaukee or Detroit.79
However, the authors found political culture was less significant in intergovernmental
relations than expected. They found that the moralistic and individualistic political
cultures had become more alike. They said that the upper Midwest and the lower
Midwest reacted in the same way to Reagan's New Federalism.80

^Ibid.. p. 298.
78Ibid.. p. 299.
^Craig A. Rimmerman, "Reagan's New Federalism and the Implementation of
Community Development Block Grants in a Midwestern City," in The Midwest Response
to the New Federalism, ed. by Gormley and Eisinger, p. 299.
^Gormley and Eisinger, The Midwest Response to the New Federalism, p. 300.
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Bingham and James noted that fiscal strain helps to form public policy. They said
that a city with low fiscal strain coped better with the federal budget cuts because it
financially absorbed the cutbacks with expenditure reductions or productivity
improvements. They added that a city with high financial strain responded to cuts by
contracting out services, cutting or reducing programs, and curtailing wages and salaries.
They found this to be true for any of the Midwestern cities which were under great
financial strain.81
Caputo and Bingham and James found that big cities were more affected by the
Reagan budget cuts than small ones.82 The authors found city size useful in explaining
the variation in responses of the Midwest to Reagan's New Federalism although they did
not predict it to be a factor.83
The Reagan budget cuts of 1981 centered on the redistributive programs that
benefited the poor like AFDC and food stamps. The authors noticed that the needs of
minority populations and the urban poor were often overlooked in redistributive programs
in the Midwestern states and local communities. The authors noted that Michigan cut
back on programs for lead-based poisoning prevention, urban rat control, and housing
rehabilitation which were important to big cities with sizable minority populations. The

81Richard D. Bingham and Peggy Ann James, "Local Fiscal Adaptations to the
New Federalism: The Lake Michigan States and the Rest of the Nation," in The Midwest
Response to the New Federalism, ed. by Gormley and Eisinger, p. 302.
82David A. Caputo, "The New Federalism: Actual and Anticipated Impact in
Midwestern Cities," in The Midwest Response to the New Federalism, ed. by Gormley
and Eisinger, p. 302.
83Gormley and Eisinger, The Midwest Response to the New Federalism, p. 302.
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authors observed that state and local politicians favored state and local programs over
federally labeled programs and preferred to look to the past when deciding which
programs to keep or cut, expecially Michigan. The authors found the Midwestern states
favored keeping keeping old programs rather than starting new ones.84
The authors concluded that the state and local politicians in both the lower and
upper Midwest adapted to federal trends and practices in order to keep federal user fees
and higher taxes. They noted that "these politicians were more practical than idealistic
and more cautious than creative" when dealing with Reagan's New Federalism. They
added that there was no difference between moralistic and individualistic political
cultures in the Midwest response to a federal government handout.85

^Ibid.. p. 303 and 304.
85Ibid.. p. 305.

CHAPTER II

METHOD

Subjects
Cities from the United States, which were over 10,000 and under 1,000,000
people and for which there was data on spending for both welfare and housing and urban
renewal, were selected from 1976-77 census data for the study. The census data listed
only cities over 10,000 or more. In the study, population was given as a percentage of
one million people to simplify data presentation. The number of cities in the listing was
118. The same cities had to remain within the 10,000 to 1,000,000 population range in
census data for 1981-82 and 1986-87 in order to be incuded in the study which compared
spending for both welfare and housing and urban renewal or community development
over three periods.

Materials
Data (for each selected city in the list) on population, welfare expenditure,
housing and urban renewal or community development expenditure, total general
expenditure, total revenue, total expenditure, federal revenue, and total general revenue
came from three sources. The first source was the 1977 Census of Governments:
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Government Finances86 The second source was the 1982 Census of Governments:
Government Finances.87 The third source was the 1987 Census of Governments:
Government Finances.88

Procedure
A listing of cities with over 10,000 and under 1,000,000 population, for which
there was data on spending for welfare and spending for housing and urban renewal, was
obtained from the 1977 census data. The result was a data base with 118 cities. Using
the census and other sources, a list was constructed containing the following information
for each of the cities in the study: name, state, population, expenditure for welfare,
expenditure for housing and urban renewal, region (Northeast, South, Midwest, or West),
political culture (moralistic, individualistic or traditionalistic), fiscal pressure, and federal
revenue dependency. The procedure was repeated to acquire the same type of
information (except for using housing and community development instead of housing
and urban renewal) for the 118 city study from the 1982 and 1987 census data. The
contents of the lists were used in a statistical computer software program for multiple

“ U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Census of Governments.
1977: Government Finances. Vol. 4, No. 4, p. 164-345.
87U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Census of Governments.
1982: Government Finances. Vol. 4, No. 4, p. 159-229.
88U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Census of Government,
1987: Government Finances. Vol. 4, No. 4, p. 158-221.
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regression analyses on city spending for welfare and spending for housing and urban
renewal or community development in 1976-77, 1981-82 and 1986-87.
In the multiple regression analyses, city spending for welfare, as a percentage of
the total general revenue, and city spending for housing and urban renewal or community
development, as a percentage of the total general revenue, for each year (1976-77, 198182 and 1986-87) were the dependent variables. The following independent variables (all
of the independent variables identified by theory as having an effect on the dependent
variable in question) included in the multiple regression analyses were: region, political
culture, population, fiscal pressure, and dependency on federal revenue. The region was
the Northeast. South, Midwest or West. The political culture was moralistic,
individualistic or traditionalistic. These variables were included in a multiple regression
by creating dummy variables. Population was the number of residents in a city as a
percentage of one million people for each of the time periods involved in the study.
Fiscal pressure was the difference between the total revenue and the total expenditure as a
percentage of the total city revenue for each of the time periods involved in the study.
City dependency on federal revenue was the federal revenue received as a percentage of
the total city general revenue for each of the time periods involved. The computer
program will supply the regression coefficients, t ratios, the Durbin-Watson statistic, R2,
and an analysis of the variance table. Regression coefficients will tell how many unit
changes in the dependent variable occur with one unit change in the independent variable
when the other independent variables are held constant. Since the magnitude of the
multiple regression coefficients are affected by the units they and the dependent variables
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are measured in, care was taken not to make inferences about the strength of the
relationships involved from the values of the coefficients in the multiple regression
equations. Standardized coefficients were used to report the findings of the regression
analyses, when inferences about the relative strength of relationships between dependent
variable and each independent variable from the value of the regression coefficients, were
made.
The Reagan administration budget cuts were hypothesized to have more of an
impact on city spending for welfare than housing and community development. Nathan
and Doolittle reported that the Reagan cuts were appreciable and aimed at those on
welfare and the working poor rather than on state and local governments. They said that
state and local governments reacted to cuts in some programs by coping but did not cope
with cuts in welfare (AFDC and Food Stamp) programs which were transferred directly
to recipients. Nathan and Doolittle and some of the authors of papers commissioned by
the Robert LaFollette Institute noted that the more redistributive a program is, the less
state and local officials will protect it from cuts (especially if it is labelled federal). Some
of the authors of papers commissioned by the Robert LaFollette Institute found that there
was a shift from redistributive to economic development in the CDBG program. The
multiple regression analyses should show that the Reagan cuts had more impact on
welfare than housing and community development and should show which variables were
important predictors of city spending on welfare and on housing and community
development for 1976-77, 1981-82 and 1986-87. If Elazar is correct, the most important
predictors of city spending on welfare and housing and community development would
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be region and political culture (moralistic political culture would be related positively to
welfare spending and individualistic political culture would be related positively to
economic development spending).
If Peterson is correct, the most important predictors of spending on welfare would
be fiscal pressure and dependency on federal revenue. If Nathan and Doolittle are correct,
the most important predictors of spending on welfare and housing and community
development would be political culture and fiscal stress. If the authors of the papers
commissioned by the LaFollette Institute are correct, the most important predictors of
such spending would be fiscal strain and population. If Morgan and England are correct,
the most important predictor of spending for welfare and for housing and community
development would be population.
In multiple regression analyses, the values of standardized regression coefficients
will allow inferences concerning the strength of the relationship between city spending
for welfare or for housing and community development and each independent variable:
region (Northeast, South, Midwest or West), political culture (individualistic,
traditionalistic or moralistic), population, fiscal pressure, and dependency on federal
revenue. Only the variables that were statistically significant at the .05 level will be
discussed along with how they relate to the dependent variable and if that relationship is
as hypothesized.

CHAPTER III

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Multiple Regression Analyses
Table 1 shows that Reagan budget cuts had more impact on city spending for
welfare than city spending for housing and community development which was as
hypothesized. This is similar to findings of Nathan and Doolittle and some of the authors
of papers commissioned by the Robert LaFollette Institute. The average city spending for
welfare by the 118 cities in the study decreased from 1976 to 1987. Average city
spending for housing and community development increased from 1976 to 1982 and
decreased slightly from 1982 to 1987 but was always more than that spent for welfare.
Table 1. Average City Spending. 1976-87 (as percentage of total expenditure)

Welfare

Housing and Community Development

1976-77

3.1%

3.5%

1981-82

2 .6%

4.9%

1986-87

2.4%

4.3%
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City Spending on Welfare in 1976-77

Table 2 shows that the independent variables which are statistically significant at
the .05 level are: Northeast and Midwest regions, moralistic and individualistic political
cultures, and population. The variable with the strongest relationship to city spending on
welfare is individualistic political culture followed in order by moralistic political culture,
Northeast region, Midwest region. South region, and population (when controlling for
other variables). Individualtistic and moralistic political cultures and population have
positive relationships with city spending for welfare (when controlling for variables).
Northeast and Midwest regions have negative relationships with city spending for welfare
(when other variables are controlled). This regression analysis explains only 28 percent
of the variation in city spending for welfare leaving 72 percent unexplained.
Table 3 shows that, when region and political culture are dropped, population is
the independent variable that is statistically significant at the .05 level. The relationship
between population and city spending for welfare (when the other variables are held
constant) is positive. This regression analysis explains only 12 percent of the variation in
spending for welfare leaving 88 percent unexplained.

City Spending on Housing and urban Renewal in 1976-77
Table 4 shows that the independent variables which are statistically significant at
the .05 level are: fiscal pressure and dependency on federal revenue. The variable with
the strongest relationship to city spending on housing and urban renewal is dependency
on federal revenue followed by fiscal pressure (when controlling for other variables).

Table 2. Multivariate Explanation for City Spending on Welfare for 1976-1977

Regression
Coefficient

t Ratio

Standardized
Regression
Coefficient

constant

-.015

-.51

-.02

Northeast

-,060a

-2.38

-,62a

.052

1.82

.51

Midwest

-,073a

-3.28

-.ST

Moralistic

.095a

3.42

.I T

Individualistic

,096a

3.47

1.00a

Population

.052a

2.16

.21a

Fiscal Pressure

.028

.90

.08

-.025

-.60

.05

South

Federal Revenue
Dependency
Summary statistic
R2

.28

Standard error

.0420

Durbin-Watson

1.3878

‘Statistically significant at .05 level.
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Table 3. Multivariate Explanation for City Spending on Welfare in 1976-77

Regression
Coefficient

t Ratio

Standardized
Regression
Coefficient

PoDulation

.087“

3.83

.34a

Fiscal Pressure

.017

.51

.05

.010

.23

.02

Federal Revenue
Detiendencv
Summarv Statistic
R2

.12

Standard error

.0454

Durbin-Watson

1.3462

“Statistically significant at .05 level.

Dependency on federal revenue and fiscal pressure have positive relationships with city
spending for housing and urban renewal when controlling for other variables. This
regression analysis explains only 15 percent of the variation in city spending for housing
and urban renewal leaving 85 percent unexplained.
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Reeression
Coefficient

t Ratio

Standardized
Reeression
Coefficient

constant

.021

.70

.02

Northeast

.005

.21

.06

-.001

i
©

Table 4. Multivariate Explanation for City Spending on Housing and Urban Renewal in
1976-77

-.01

Midwest

.017

.75

.14

Moralistic

-.010

-.36

-.09

Individualistic

-.016

-.56

-.18

Population

-.019

-.77

-.08

South

Fiscal Pressure

.070a

2.19

.20a

.136a

3.15

.30a

Federal Revenue
Deriendencv
Summarv Statistic
R2

.15

Standard error

.0430

Durbin-Watson

1.5516

'Statistically significant at .05 level.
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Table 5 shows that, when region and political culture are dropped, dependency on
federal revenue and fiscal pressure are independent variables that are statistically
significant at the .05 level. The variable with the strongest relationship to city spending
for housing and urban renewal is dependency on federal revenue followed by fiscal
pressure (when the other variables are held constant). Dependency on federal revenue
and fiscal pressure have positive relationships with city spending for housing and urban
renewal when controlling for other variables. This regression analysis explains only 13
percent of the variation in spending leaving 87 percent unexplained.

City Spending on Welfare in 1981-82
Table 6 shows that the independent variables which are statistically significant at
the .05 level are: Midwest region, moralistic and individualistic political cultures. The
variable with the strongest relationship to city spending on welfare is individualistic
political culture followed in order by moralistic political culture and Midwest region
(when controlling for other variables). Individualistic and moralistic political cultures
have positive relationships with city spending for welfare (when controlling for other
variables). Midwest region has a negative relationship with city spending for welfare
(when other variables are controlled). This regression analysis explains only 18 percent
of the variation in city spending for welfare leaving 82 percent unexplained.
Table 7 shows that, when region and political culture are dropped, population is
the independent variable that is statistically significant at the .05 level. The relationship
between population and city spending for welfare (when the other variables are held
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Table 5. Multivariate Explanation for City Spending on Housing and Urban Renewal in

1976-77

Regression
Coefficient

PoDulation
Fiscal Pressure

-.021

t Ratio

-.92

Standardized
Regression
Coefficient

-.09

.073“

2.37

.21“

.130“

3.14

.28“

Federal Revenue
Dependency
Summary statistic
R2

.13

Standard error

.0425

Durbin-Watson

1.5394

“Statistically significant at .05 level.
constant) is positive. This regression analysis explains only 10 percent of the variation in
spending for welfare leaving 90 percent unexplained.
City Spending on Housing and Community Development in 1981-82
Table 8 shows that the independent variables which are statistically significant at
the .05 level are: Midwest region and dependency on federal revenue. The variable with
the strongest relationship to city spending on housing and community development is
dependency on federal revenue followed by the Midwest (when controlling for other

Table 6. Multivariate Explanation for City Spending on Welfare for 1981-82

Regression
Coefficient

t Ratio

Standardized
Regression
Coefficient

constant

-.004

-.16

-.001

Northeast

-.015

-.76

-.23

.025

1.15

.35

Midwest

-.035“

-2.04

-.40“

Moralistic

.048“

2.35

.56“

Individualistic

.042“

2.08

.64“

Population

.032

1.73

.18

Fiscal Pressure

.041

1.34

.13

.006

.13

.01

South

Federal Revenue
Dependency
Summary statistic
R2

.18

Standard error

.0311

Durbin-Watson

1.8101

“Statistically significant at .05 level.
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Table 7. Multivariate Explanation for City Spending on Welfare in 1981-82

Standardized
Regression
Coefficient

Regression
t Ratio

Coefficient

PoDulation

.040“

2.34

.22“

Fiscal Pressure

.052

1.82

.17

.006

.15

.01

Federal Revenue
Dependency
Summarv statistic
R2

.10

Standard

.0320

Durbin-Watson

1.7146

“Statistically significant at .05 level.
variables). Dependency on federal revenue and Midwest region have positive
relationships with city spending for housing and community development (when
controlling for other variables). This regression analysis explains only 33 percent of the
variation in city spending with 67 percent explained.
Table 9 shows that, when region and political culture are dropped, dependency on
federal revenue is the independent variable that is statistically significant at the .05 level.
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Table 8. Multivariate Explanaton for City Spending on Housing and Community
Development in 1981-82
Standardized
Regression
Coefficient

Regression
Coefficient

t Ratio

constant

-.016

-.54

-.02

Northeast

.036

1.31

.36

South

.013

.42

.12

Midwest

.053a

2.24

.39a

Moralistic

-.022

-.77

-.17

Individualistic

-.011

-.38

-.11

.036

1.43

.13

-.040

-.95

-.09

PoDulation
Federal Pressure
Federal Revenue
Dependency

.353a

Summary statistic
R2

.33

Standard error

.0431

Durbin-Watson

1.3655

Statistically significant at .05 level.

5.85

.52a
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Table 9. Multivariate Explanation for City Spending on Housing and Community
Development in 1981-82

Regression
Coefficient

PoDulation
Fiscal Pressure

t Ratio

Standardized
Regression
Coefficient

.022

.94

.08

-.055

-1.41

-.12

Federal Revenue
Dependency

.339a

5.83

,50a

Summary Statistic
R2

.27

Standard error

.0439

Durbin-Watson

1.2774

aStatistically significant at .05 level.
The variable with the strongest relationship to city spending for housing and community
development is dependency on federal revenue (when the other variables are held
constant). Dependency on federal revenue has a positive relationship with city spending
for housing and community development (when controlling for other variables). This
regression analysis explains only 27 percent of the variation in spending leaving 73
percent unexplained.
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City Spending on Welfare in 1986-87

Table 10 shows that the independent variables, moralistic and individualistic
political cultures, are statistically significant at the .05 level. The variable with the
strongest relationship to city spending on welfare is individualistic political culture
followed by moralistic political culture (when controlling for other variables).
Individualistic and moralistic political cultures have positive relationships with city
spending for welfare (when controlling for other variables). This regression analysis
explains only 16 percent of the variation in city spending for welfare leaving 84 percent
of the spending unexplained.
Table 11 shows that, when region and political culture are dropped, population is
the independent variable that is statistically significant at the .05 level. The relationship
between population and city spending for welfare (when the other variables are held
constant) is strong and positive. This regression analysis explains only 6 percent of the
variation in spending for welfare leaving 94 percent unexplained.
City Spending on Housing and Comunitv Development in 1986-87
Table 12 shows that the independent variable which is statistically significant at
the .05 level is dependency on federal revenue. The variable with the strongest
relationship to city spending on housing and community development is dependency on
federal revenue (when controlling for other variables). Dependency on federal revenue
has a positive relationship with city spending for housing and community development
(when controlling for other variables). This regression analysis explains only 22 percent
of the variation in city spending with 78 percent unexplained.
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Table 10. Multivariate Explanation for City Spending on Welfare for 1986-87

Regression
Coefficient

t Ratio

Standardized
Regression
Coefficient

constant

-.009

-.42

-.01

Northeast

-.017

-.93

-.27

.033

1.60

.49

-.031

-1.89

-.37

South

.045a

2.31

.56a

Individualistic

o
o

Midwest

2.64

.80a

PoDulation

.029

1.70

.18

Fiscal Pressure

-.008

-.35

-.03

Dependency

-.041

-.69

-.06

Moralistic

Summary statistic
R2

.16

Standard error

.0301

Durbin-Watson

1.7635

Statistically significant at .05 level.
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Table 11. Multivariate Explanation for City Spending on Welfare in 1986

Regression
Coefficient

t Ratio

Standardized
Regression
Coefficient

PoDulation

.041“

2.72

.26“

Fiscal Pressure

.007

.34

.03

-.044

-.73

-.07

Federal Revenue
Dependency
Summarv statistic
R2

.06

Standard error

.0310

Durbin-Watson

1.6610

“Statistically significant at .05 level.
Table 13 shows that, when region and political culture are dropped, dependency
on federal revenue is the independent variable that is statistically significant at the .05
level. The variable with the strongest relationship to city spending for housing and
community development is dependency on federal revenue (when the other variables are
held constant). Dependency on federal revenue has a positive relationship with city
spending for housing and community development (when controlling for other variables).

50

Table 12. Multivariate Explanation for City Spending on Housing and Community
Development in 1986-87

t Ratio

Standardized
Regression
Coefficient

.021

.80

.02

Northeast

.006

.26

.07

South

.020

.76

.22

Midwest

.029

1.42

.26

Moralistic

-.010

-.41

.10

Individualistic

-.010

-.41

-.12

Population

-.017

-.79

Fiscal Pressure

-.021

O
OO
r

-.07

o
OO

constant

i

Regression
Coefficient

Federal Revenue
Deoendencv

,279a

Summary statistic
R2

.22

Standard error

.0373

Durbin-Watson

1.9980

aStatistically significant at .05 level.

3.72

,33a
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Table 13. Multivariate Explanation for City Spending on Housing and Community
Development in 1986-87

Regression
Coefficient

t Ratio

Standardized
Regression
Coefficient

Population

-.014

-.75

-.07

Fiscal Pressure

-.028

-1.05

-.09

Federal Revenue
Dependency

.317“

4.23

.32“

Summary Statistic
R2

.14

Standard error

.0383

Durbin-Watson

1.8356

“Statistically significant at .05 level.
This regression analysis explains only 14 percent of the variation in spending on housing
and community development leaving 86 percent unexplained.

City Spending for Welfare and Spending for Housing and Community Development in
1976-87
Table 14 shows that the independent variables which are consistently statistically
significant at the .05 level for city spending on welfare from 1976-87 are individualistic
and moralistic political cultures. The variable with the strongest relationship to city
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Table 14. City Spending for Welfare and Housing and Community Development:
Multiple Regression Analysis
Predictors of Spending
for Welfare

-.02

Northeast

-,62a

South

1

constant

©
©
h—
»

1976-77

Standardized Regression
Coefficient (Beta)
1981-82
1986-87

-.23

.51 R2=.28

.35 RH18

-.01
-.27
.49 R2=.16

-.40“

Moralistic

.77“

.56“

.56“

1.00a

.64“

.80“

Population

.21“

.18

.18

Fiscal Pressure

.08

.13

Federal deoendencv

.05

.01

-.06

Individualistic

m

-,57a

©
r

-.37

Midwest

Predictors of Spending for Housing/Communitv Development
-.02

.02

Northeast

.06

.36

.07

.12 R2=.33

.22 R2=.22

.39“

.26

South

to
.11

.02

i
o

constant

Midwest

.14

Moralistic

-.09

-.17

.10

Individualistic

-.18

-.11

-.12

Population

-.08

.13

-.08

-.09

-.07

Fiscal pressure

.20“

Federal dependency

.20“

Significant at .05 level.

.52“

.33“
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spending for welfare is individualistic political culture followed by moralistic political
culture (when controlling for other variables). Both individualistic and moralistic
political cultures have positive relationships with city spending for welfare (when
controlling for other variables). Elazar was correct in concluding that political culture
affected city spending for welfare although individualistic political culture is committed
to private welfare and moralistic is committed to general welfare. Nathan and Doolittle
were correct in concluding that political cultures affected how the communities responded
to budget cuts. However, the regression analyses explain only a small percentage of
variation in city spending on welfare from 1976-87.
Table 14 shows that the independent variable which is consistently statistically
significant at the .05 level for city spending for housing and community development
from 1976-87 is dependency on federal revenue. Dependency on federal revenue has a
positive relationship to city spending on housing and community development (when
controlling other variables). This is contrary to Peterson's argument that the goal of local
government is the efficient development of the local economy with concern over long
term economic welfare and limits of what is possible. Thus, the regression analyses
explain only a small percentage of variation in spending on housing and community
development from 1976-87.
Table 15 shows that removing the dummy variables for region and political
culture had more of an impact on the prediction of city spending for welfare than on
spending for housing and community development from 1976-87.
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Table 15. City Spending for Welfare and Housing and Community Development:
Multiple Regression Analysis

Standardized Regression
Coefficient (Beta)
1976-76
1981-1982

1986-87

PoDulation

.34a

.22a

.26a

Fiscal pressure

.05 R2=.12

.17 R2=. 10

.03 R2=.06

Federal dependency

.02

.01

Predictors of Spending
for Welfare

-.07

Predictors of Spending for Housing/Communitv Development
Population

-.09 R2=. 13

Fiscal pressure

.21a

Federal dependency

.28a

.08 R2=.27
-.12
.50a

-.07 R2=.14
-.09
.32a

a Significant at .05 level.
The study shows that Reagan's budget cuts had more impact on welfare than for
housing and community development which confirmed the author's expectations. The
study also shows that the best predictors of city spending on welfare are individualistic
and moralistic political cultures and the best predictor of spending on housing and
community development is dependency on federal revenue (when controlling the other
variables). Unfortunately, none of the regression equations explain much of the variance
in city spending on welfare and spending on housing and community development. The
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results might lead another researcher toward modifying these explanations and doing
further empirical work.
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